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Seminari di Filosofia

22 maggio

Immagine
Centro: n.e.t.s

Seminari di Filosofia IUSS - Organizzati nell'ambito del
Centro di Ricerca in Neurocognizione, Epistemologia e Sintassi teorica (NEtS)

Aula 1-17
IUSS, Palazzo del Broletto
Piazza della Vittoria n. 15 – Pavia

22 Maggio 2018, 11-13

“AFFECTIVE SCAFFOLDING AND INCORPORATIONS”

Relatore: Giovanna Colombetti – University of Exeter

Much has been said so far about how we use the environment (people and objects) to scaffold our cognitive capacities, i.e., to enhance them beyond what would otherwise be possible on the basis merely of our “unaided” biological capacities. I show that the notion of “scaffolding” can be applied also to affective states, and I argue that there are special cases of “affective scaffolding” where scaffolds are incorporated into the affective state. Incorporation, as I use this term, refers to the phenomenological integration of an object into one’s sense of self (in various senses of “self” that I will discuss). 

22 Maggio 2018, 15-17

“FROM FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE TO SELF-REPRESENTATION: PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOGENESIS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS”

Relatore: Mariaflavia Cascelli – Università di Roma Tre

The traditional subject-object model of knowledge applied to self-consciousness determines a circularity that lies at the core of the epistemological philosophical problem of self-consciousness. In order to avoid the circularity ensuing from this model, a quite intuitive conceptual move suggests that at least in part self-consciousness is somehow prior to the reflexing process of the subject representing himself as the object of its consciousness (Musholt, 2015). My talk deals with the connection of this proposal to the empirical inquiry on self-consciousness, i.e. with the attempt to find experiential and developmental evidences for the aforementioned intuition. Through the analysis of some of these alleged evidences, I argue that the kind of self-consciousness which is developmental-independent merges with the experiential life of an organism’s first-person perspective, and I question the identity of first-person perspective and self-consciousness from both a phenomenological and ontogenetical point of view.

Musholt, K. (2015), Thinking About Oneself. From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self,Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Info: giulia.piredda@iusspavia.it; alfredo.tomasetta@iusspavia.it

Ingresso libero fino ad esaurimento posti.

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